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COLLOQUY

THE NATURE OF JUS COGENS*
by Mark W. Janis**
Jus cogens, compelling law, is the modern concept of international
law that posits norms so fundamental to the public order of the international community that they are potent enough to invalidate contrary
rules which might otherwise be consensually established by states. The
most notable appearance of jus cogens is, of course, in article 53 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,' where the term is rendered
in English as "peremptory norm":
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.'
The Vienna Convention further provides that: "If a new peremptory
norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is
* An earlier draft of this note was prepared as part of the work of the International Law
Association (American Branch) Committee on the Formation of Customary Law on which the
author serves.
** Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. A.B., Princeton University;
B.A., M.A., Oxford University; J.D., Harvard University.
1. May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, U.N. Sales No. E.70.V.6 (1970), reprinted in 63
AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
2. Id. art. 53.
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in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates." 3
Looking at the Vienna Convention, it is sometimes (but I think
wrongly) presumed that jus cogens must be a form of customary international law, the law developed by state practice in international relations and by implicit state consent. For example, the Restatement of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) opines that
jus cogens "is now widely accepted . . . as a principle of customary
law (albeit of higher status)."' 4 To base this conclusion on the definition
of "peremptory norm" in the Vienna Convention, one must make a
number of assumptions: 1) that despite the limitation "[flor the purposes of the present Convention," the provision can be generally applied to international law; 2) that there is an equivalence between the
term "peremptory norm" and the term "jus cogens"; and 3) that there
is a further equivalence between the term "general international law"
and the term "customary international law." Putting aside the first two
assumptions (I have no problem at all with the second) it strikes me
that the third is insupportable.
The central problem with equating "general international law"
and "customary international law" is, I think, that customary international law is by its very nature not an apt instrument for the development of non-derogable rules, norms with a potency superior even to
treaty rules. As usually conceived customary international law is the
weak sister of conventional international law. Both are based on state
practice, but treaties show the practice explicitly in the form of written
rules, while the rules of custom must be drawn awkwardly from the
various evidences of state diplomacy or pronouncements. Both treaty
and custom are grounded on the idea of agreement. Here again, treaties are stronger, since consent is shown by a ratification process, while
the consensual foundations of custom must be demonstrated more uncertainly by expressions of the law-like character of the rules, the
vague notion of opinio juris. That any form of customary international
law can be said to be so firmly rooted that it can be employed to prospectively repudiate subsequent treaty rules is, I think, a proposition
that makes nonsense of the usual theory of customary and conventional
5
international law.
3. Id. art. 64.
4. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised) § 102
reporter's note 6 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
5. 1 more fully explore the nature of customary international law in M.W. JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 35-46 (1988).
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It is more reasonable, I think, to understand the Vienna Convention's term "general international law" to signify not customary international law, but rather, and more precisely, those non-derogable rules
described in the text of the Vienna Convention itself. We are thus
saved the improbable task of elaborating two sorts of customary international law: the one making ordinary consensual rules, the other creating rules with a permanence which even treaties cannot supersede.
The term "customary international law" could have been employed in
article 53, but was not. The special definition of jus cogens as a peremptory norm in the Vienna Convention takes the concept out from
the bounds of customary international law and gives it its own character and essence.
The distinctive character essence of jus cogens is such, I submit,
as to blend the concept into traditional notions of natural law. Such a
blending makes sense both historically and functionally. Historically, it
is significant that the proponents of the idea of peremptory norms invalidating treaty rules were, in no small measure, reacting to the
abuses of Nazism during the Second World War.6 They rejected the
positivist proposition that state acts, even the making of treaties, should
be always thought capable of making binding law. Verdross, one of jus
cogens' earliest advocates 7 explained that the concept of jus cogens
was quite alien to legal positivists, but "[tihe situation was quite different in the natural law school of international law." 8 Natural lawyers
were ready to accept "the idea of a necessary law which all states are
obliged to observe .

. . ,

[that is, an] ethics of the world." 9

When the first drafts of what were to become the Vienna Convention's peremptory norm provisions were introduced in the International
Law Commission by Lauterpacht in 1953, he made a clear distinction
between the new notion, as yet untermed, and customary international
law: "the test was not inconsistency with customary international law
pure and simple but inconsistency with such overriding principles of
international law which may be regarded as constituting principles of
international public policy."'" And as Schwelb noted, though the term
jus cogens may be new, "the concept of an international ordre public
6. See E. JIMtNEZ DE ARECHAGA, EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL CONTEMPORANEO 79 (1980).
7. See Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1937).
8. Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55, 56
(1966).
9. Id.
10. Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens As Formulated by the International
Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 949 (1967).
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has been advocated for a very long time."" Jus Cogens is a legal emanation which grew out of the naturalist schooi, from those who were
uncomfortable with the positivists' elevation of the state as the sole
source of international law.
Functionally, a rule of jus cogens is, by its nature and utility, a
rule so fundamental to the international community of states as a
whole that the rule constitutes a basis for the community's legal system. Perforce and per article 53, a rule of jus cogens is ordinarily nonderogable and invalidates subsequent norms generated by treaty or by
custom, that is, by the ordinary consensual forms of international legislation. Thus it is a sort of international law that, once ensconced, cannot be displaced by states, either in their treaties or in their practice.
Jus cogens therefore functions like a natural law that is so fundamental
that states, at least for the time being, cannot avoid its force.
Partly because of its perceived potency, a peremptory norm is even
more difficult to prove and establish than a usually controversial rule of
customary international law. In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases,
the International Court of Justice explicitly put itself on record as not
"attempting to enter into, still less pronounce upon any question of jus
cogens.'1 2 There seems to be no example in modern international practice of a treaty being voided by a peremptory norm.' 3
Nonetheless, there have been frequent assertions by states and
others that certain principles of law are so fundamental as to be considered jus cogens. For example, there are the principles of articles 1 and
2 of the Charter of the United Nations, which guarantee the sovereignty of states. Some human rights, too, are claimed to be protected
by rules of jus cogens.'4
Probably no rule better fits the definition of a norm of jus cogens
than pacta sunt servanda, for it is essential to the theory of both conventional and customary international law that contracts between states
be legally binding. However, it is difficult to understand how the obligatory force of agreements can be attributed to either treaty or custom
without making a circular argument. If either a treaty or a customary
rule be said to impose the rule pacta sunt servanda, why should that
11. Id.
12. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Get. v. Den.; W. Get. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 42
(Judgment of Feb. 20).
13. See Gaja, Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention, 172 HAGUE RECUEIL 271, 286-89
(1981).
14. See Robledo, Le jus cogens international: sa gbnese, sa nature, ses fonctions, 172 HAGUE
RECUEIL 9, 167-87 (1981).
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treaty or customary rule be valid unless it relied upon that very rule of
legal obligation that is itself at issue?
It makes much better sense to argue that the pacta sunt servanda
rule is neither a rule of conventional or customary international law,
but rather a norm fundamental to the legal system from which both
treaty and customary rules derive. Indeed, it might do to conceive of
the pacta sunt servanda norm as just the kind of non-derogable rule
described as a peremptory norm in the Vienna Convention. In effect,
this compelling law, jus cogens, is not a form of customary international law, but a form of international constitutional law, a norm which
sets the very foundations of the international legal system.
In a sense, pacta sunt servanda rules may be seen to be a form of
natural law if we take an organic view of the term "natural." A rule
such as pacta sunt servanda is natural to the international community
of states because there would be no such community without such a
rule. The norm is intrinsic to the very existence of the given community. This does not mean that the rule is one prescribed by nature to
every community or every legal system or to any given community's
legal system at any given time. Rather, the word "natural" has to do
with the organic or constitutional aspect of the rule: that it concerns
the fundamental order of the community and its legal system.

